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1. Preliminaries 
For all its faults—and they are legion—Twitter is a great resource for social epistemology. 
Particularly over the last five years, the platform has provided a window into our collective 
practices surrounding testimony of sexual assault and harassment. As women reported the 
sexual misconduct of various high-profile men in the wake of the #metoo campaign, Twitter 
preserved a public record of a common pattern: a woman accuses a man of misconduct. He 
denies the accusation, and in the subsequent discussion someone urges the importance of the 
presumption of innocence and due process: we are told to not ‘condemn him in the court of 
public opinion’ until the accuser produces ‘real evidence’ sufficient to establish his guilt 
beyond reasonable doubt. As these patterns recurred on the day after Christine Blasey Ford’s 
testimony at the Kavanaugh confirmation hearings (September 27 2018), a full-page color ad 
appeared in the New York Times, saying simply: ‘BELIEVE WOMEN’.1 The phrase also 
began trending on Twitter, as users urged us to #BelieveWomen. Predictably, the same 
general patterns recurred in response to the hashtag: Op-Eds appeared, worrying that 
believing women short-circuits due process, strips the accused of the presumption of 
innocence, or urges us to ignore the facts.2 Similar numbers of editorials sprang up in reply.  
 There is a cluster of difficult questions here, both interpretive and normative. Among 
them: how should we understand the social project of the ‘#BelieveWomen’ campaign?3 and 
 
1 The ad was sponsored by the dating ap Bumble, which is distinctive in requiring women to make the first 
move, and is marketed as a way to at least somewhat reduce the amount of harassment women face when dating 
(Morgan Gstalter, “Dating App Bumble Publishes Full-Page Ad in NY Times: 'Believe Women',” The Hill, 
September 28, 2018. https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/408946-female-driven-dating-app-bumble-
publishes-full-page-ad-in-the.) 
2 Bari Weiss rejects #BelieveWomen with the explanation: “I believe that facts serve feminists far better than 
faith. That due process is better than mob rule. […] What we owe all people, including women, is to listen to 
them and to respect them and to take them seriously. But we don’t owe anyone our unthinking belief.” (Weiss, 
Opinion, “The Limits of Believe All Women,” New York Times, Nov 28, 2017. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/28/opinion/metoo-sexual-harassment-believe-women.html) 
3 One important question which I will not spend much time addressing is how we should read ‘women’ in 
‘#BelieveWomen.’ On one reading, it restricts the scope of the campaign to only testifiers who are female or have 
a feminine gender, or to only those who suffer identity-prejudicial credibility deficits in virtue of their 
membership in this social group. This reading constrains the scope of the people whom we are to believe, but 
leave the topics on which we are to believe them unrestricted. An alternative reading, which I find more 
attractive, takes the primary aim to be to secure credibility for people who are reporting sexual assault or 
harassment. Insofar as these reports are stereotypically made by women, it is plausible that anyone making such 
a report is subject to what Emmalon Davis calls a ‘Content-Based Testimonial Injustice:’ unjust skepticism or 
dismissal of a content, stemming from a prejudice against the social identity with which that content is 
associated (see Emmalon Davis, “A Tale of Two Injustices: Epistemic Injustice in Philosophy,” in Applied 
Epistemology, ed. Jennifer Lackey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). On this reading, the 
 
 
what does the presumption of innocence even mean outside legal contexts? Kimberly 
Ferzan’s paper in this volume (“#BelieveWomen and the Presumption of Innocence: 
Clarifying the Questions for Law and Life”) pursues both questions with rigor and clarity, and 
my contribution will engage closely with hers. Obviously, a slogan can be used to mean many 
things, and undoubtedly there’s substantial variation in what those who tweet 
#BelieveWomen actually mean. I’m pursuing a partly reconstructive, rather than purely 
descriptive project: I seek a charitable interpretation that construes the demand made in the 
most reasonable and well-grounded way consistent with (many but not all) of the ways the 
tag is actually used. 
A tempting—and popular—way to understand the hashtag is that it demands that we 
believe what women tell us, when and because they tell us. The most extreme formulation of 
this is that we owe it to all women, without exception, to believe what they say without 
question.4 This seems to be how Margaret Atwood interpreted the hashtag; when asked to 
comment, she dismissed it, saying, “Women schwomen—I don’t think you should believe all 
anything [...] It’s more useful to say listen to all women and take what they’re saying seriously 
enough to actually do investigations.”5 While Ferzan’s rich and provocative paper explores a 
wide range of ways to understand the hashtag, it devotes special attention to leveraging the 
conceptual resources of contemporary epistemology to reconstruct and consider a less 
extreme formulation of this interpretation, “as a call to trust and as a call to non-reductionism 
[about testimonial justification]. That is, not only do we owe it to women to start with a 
baseline of trust but this trust will justify our believing them.”6 
Like Atwood, Ferzan rejects the demand so construed, at least in legal contexts, noting 
that when the stakes are high, we cannot base our beliefs simply on the say-so of women (or 
anyone, for that matter), but must rather examine the credibility of every witness, and 
apportion our degree of confidence in what was said to the evidential force we take the 
speaker’s testimony to provide. Both Atwood and Ferzan are clear that they take the hashtag 
to be prompted by a real problem: women are persistently under-trusted specifically when 
they bring first-personal accusations of assault. And both think some epistemic fix is called 
 
prejudice to be addressed is principally against women, but the motivating issue is a tendency to dismiss 
testimony reporting the sexual misconduct of prominent men. What I say should hold for either reading. 
4 This extreme interpretation is particularly favored by those who think the hashtag makes an unreasonable 
demand. There are in fact two variants of the tag: ‘#BelieveWomen’ and ‘#BelieveAllWomen.’ The latter appears 
to have emerged later (it rose to prominence when David French re-tweeted Juanita Broaddrick’s accusation 
that Hilary Clinton “tried to silence” her). As compared to the more ambiguous ‘#BelieveWomen,’ the 
‘#BelieveAllWomen’ tag is used disproportionately often by detractors (see Susan Finaldi, “#BelieveAllWomen is 
a Right-Wing trap,” New York Times, May 18, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/18/opinion/tara-reade-
believe-all-women.html )  
5 Interview with Sam Gillette, People Magazine, Sep. 11, 2019.  
6 Kimberly Ferzan, “#BelieveWomen and the Presumption of Innocence: Clarifying the Questions for Law 
and Life,” in THIS VOLUME, 8. Ferzan is clear that she does not endorse this reading, but thinks it sufficiently 
plausible to merit substantial attention. I will postpone discussion until §2, but very briefly: ‘non-reductionism’ 
here refers to the view that the evidential justification we receive from testimony does not necessarily reduce 
simply to the evidence we have about the speaker’s reliability. Instead, hearers have a defeasible default 
entitlement to believe the contents of speakers’ testimony.  
 
 
for: we need to trust women more than we do. Atwood suggests that the needed fix is taking 
their testimony to give us sufficient reason to do a thorough investigation; Ferzan proposes 
increasing our confidence in their testimony in order to cancel out our (probably 
subconscious) unjustified distrust of women as testifiers.7 But both think asking us to believe 
women demands too much. 
While I agree that we should not simply believe what women say because they’re women, 
I do not think that is the best understanding of the demand to #BelieveWomen. Nor do I 
think we should understand the demand as a call to be non-reductionists about testimonial 
justification.  In fact, as I will argue in §2, I think the hashtag aims to call attention to a way 
that women are wronged when not believed, rather than to the fact that their testimony can 
make belief rational.  In §3, I’ll argue that in fact the demands of #BelieveWomen are quite 
modest; it does not require anything like simply accepting whatever women assert as true. We 
should distinguish between the attitudes of believing a speaker and believing a proposition, 
and resist the assumption that believing a speaker entails forming a full belief in the 
proposition asserted. I outline an alternative model according to which believing a speaker is 
taking their assurance to provide evidence of the truth of the thing asserted, and orienting 
one’s further inquiry in certain characteristic ways. If we interpret the demand to believe 
women as a demand to respond to their testimony as I suggest, the demand is fully consistent 
with investigating the evidence in the ways Ferzan and Atwood advocate. 
If this is right, it becomes harder to see why so anyone would think that there is a conflict 
between believing women and due process or the presumption of innocence. In §4, I suggest 
that the sense of conflict stems from the pragmatic implicatures generated by the appeals to 
the presumption of innocence in everyday contexts. Though the literal assertoric content of 
such appeals does not entail that victims’ testimony is not evidence, it is nevertheless often 
reasonable for hearers to react as though the speaker does in fact dismiss victim testimony. 
This is because the presumption only concerns what to do when we have yet to receive 
evidence, and so when invoked after hearing victim testimony, implies that the speaker 
accords the testimony little to no weight. 
One of the themes I’ll return to throughout is that speakers who offer testimony—at least 
in the paradigmatic cases for which #BelieveWomen is invoked—have a positive entitlement 
to being believed or treated as trustworthy. I take this up explicitly in §5, in part to trace out 
the basis for this entitlement, and in part to demonstrate that the analysis I offer of what it 
takes fulfill our obligation to believe women does address these interests. But while I think it 
is important to recognize that there is a way to interpret #BelieveWomen as a nuanced 
epistemic instruction, I do not ultimately think this is the best way to think about the social 
project of the hashtag campaign. As part of a large-scale social project, #BelieveWomen does 
more than deliver instructions for correcting individual epistemic bias. In §6, I suggest that it 
works to call attention to a particularly pernicious trope operating in the background: that 
‘women lie about assault.’ As long as something like this is socially accepted, we are primed to 
 
7 This is the corrective for testimonial injustice proposed by Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and 
the Ethics of Knowing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
 
 
respond to women who testify about assaults with suspicion—an affect that crowds out the 
trust necessary to afford their testimony appropriate credibility. 
My discussion centers on everyday contexts, rather than legal ones, partly because this is 
where the collision between the invocations of the hashtag and presumption is most vivid, 
and partly because I don’t think the epistemic norms for these two domains are so different. I 
will consequently use ‘testimony’ and ‘evidence’ in their loose everyday senses, rather than in 
their strict legal senses.  
2. Distinguishing questions of justification and obligation 
Let’s start by taking a closer look at the subject matter of the call to #BelieveWomen. One 
of the central contributions of Ferzan’s paper, I think, is its focus on the demand to 
appropriately respect women who testify. Ferzan suggests interpreting the hashtag “as a call 
to trust and as a call to non-reductionism” (p8), because of its emphasis on testimony as an 
interaction involving respect; as she writes, “only to non-reductionists is believing women 
about believing speakers.”8 The argument here is reminiscent of Goldberg’s (2019) contention 
that any plausible defense of a speaker’s entitlement to be trusted must take non-
reductionism as a premise.9 It is true that non-reductionists foreground the speaker as the 
source of reasons for belief in testimony, but we should distinguish carefully between two 
readings of the question ‘when should we believe testimony?’ 
The reading central to the reductionist-vs.-non-reductionist debate considers testimony 
as an input to our rational behavior as epistemic agents. Both theories aim to address a 
question about what anchors the evidential value of testimony, roughly: ‘when and how does 
being told that p provide sufficient justification to make belief in p rationally permissible?’. 
Call this the evidential question. The reductionist says the evidential value of testimony that p 
is indirect, and reduces to our independent reason to take the testifier to be credible. Non-
reductionists maintain that when we receive testimony from someone that p, unless there are 
specific reasons to doubt them, we are directly (defeasibly) rationally permitted to base our 
epistemic confidence in p on their assurance; we do not need to first investigate their 
credibility in order to be justified in believing what they have told us.10 Both focus on how 
testimony provides enough evidence to rationally permit belief in a proposition p; here there 
is no question of owing belief. 
But testimony is also more than this: it is an interaction of trust, a cooperative exchange 
between responsible moral and epistemic agents.11 In offering testimony, a speaker ‘vouches 
 
8 Ferzan MS p. 11, emphasis in original.  
9 Sanford Goldberg, “Anti-Reductionism and Expected Trust,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 
(December 2019): 952-970, doi:10.1111/papq.12277.  
10 For more thorough explication of testimonial anti-reductionism, see Jennifer Lackey, “A Minimal 
Expression of Anti-reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony,” Noûs 37 (December 2003): 706-23. 
11 Richard Moran appeals to this aspect of testimony to ground his non-reductionist claim: we are entitled 
to trust the speaker’s assurances. Richard Moran, “Getting Told and Being Believed,” Philosophers' Imprint 5 
(August 2005): 1-29. 
 
 
for’ the truth of her assertion; she stakes her own competence as an epistemic agent as an 
assurance. There are deep parallels between this sort of exchange and other core exercises of 
normative agency, including the making of promises and contracts. The same reactive 
attitudes seem licensed in response to failures.12 We feel resentment when we accept 
testimony but later discover the testifier was wrong, and injury or indignation at having our 
testimony unfairly rejected; we feel that we were owed more care.13 Non-reductionism stresses 
the ways that agency underwrites the justification provided by testimony, but frames it as 
merely permissive: we are issued an invitation, not an obligation.14 But if we fix on the ethical 
dimension, while it is true that testifiers issue an invitation to trust, it is not merely a 
permission; absent good reason, we cannot decline it without wronging them.15 So, there is an 
ethical question about testimony, distinct from the evidential question: ‘under what 
circumstances do we owe it to the testifier to believe them?’ 
The two questions are very different. The evidential question focuses on what rational 
permissions we receive from testimony; the ethical question on what we owe to speakers who 
testify to us. I maintain that the answers to the two questions are also largely independent: 
settling what explains how testimony can provide adequate warrant to permit rational belief 
in a proposition does not settle when we owe it to someone to believe them, nor even what 
cognitive attitude one must adopt in order to count as believing someone.16  There are three 
distinct issues here: 
(a) Is the justification testimony provides for confidence in p direct or indirect? 
(b) When (if ever) do testifiers have an entitlement to be believed? 
(c) Does believing a testifier entail adopting an attitude of full belief toward the 
propositional content they asserted? 
Taking #BelieveWomen to call for non-reductionism, I suggest, would subtly conflate 
(a)—an inquiry into the evidential question—with (b), an instance of the ethical question. 
When we ask whether we are really obligated to #BelieveWomen, the underlying issue is, 
‘what do we owe to women, when they testify?’ Both Goldberg (2019) and Ferzan (MS) 
 
12 These `Strawsonian’ reactive attitudes are a hallmark of interactions between morally responsible agents. 
See P.F. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” Proceedings of the British Academy 48 (1962): 1–25. 
13 Moran, “Getting Told” explicitly draws the parallel between the act of assertion involved in testimony and 
promises. Both actions indicate commitment on the part of the speaker, and change the normative relations 
between speaker and hearer, generating new obligations and permissions.  
14 See Moran, “Getting Told,” and especially Goldberg, “Anti-Reductionism” for discussion on this point. 
15 Others have made this point as well. See Allan Hazlett, “On the Special Insult of Refusing Testimony,” 
Philosophical Explorations 20: supp. 1 (2017): 37-51. 10.1080/13869795.2017.1287293; and Richard Holton, 
“Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (March 1994): 63-76.  
16 As Sandy Goldberg emphasized to me, taking these questions to be independent risks discovering that the 
norms of rational inquiry conflict with the ethical norms on belief. As will become clear in §4, I do not think 
they do conflict in this case. But either way, it seems to me that this sort of normative conflict is not a priori 
impossible, and so we must simply face our fears. 
 
 
recognize that (a) and (b) are distinct, but take it that if testifiers have an entitlement to being 
believed, it would be grounded in an entitlement to be trusted qua speaker, a thought closely 
associated with non-reductionist answers to (a). Both are skeptical of such an entitlement 
because they take the answer to (c) to be ‘yes.’ Interpreting the hashtag as demanding that we 
believe what women tell us also presupposes a ‘yes’ answer to (c).  
To make it clear that there is space for a different answer, it will help to introduce another 
set of distinctions, this time between three different concepts we routinely use the word 
‘believe’ to express. The first two are attitudes we take toward truth-evaluable propositions.  
The one most familiar to epistemologists, perhaps, is a subjective attitude of full confidence 
or high credence in the truth of a proposition p.17 The second is more action-oriented: it is the 
attitude we take when we close inquiry whether p, having concluded that (given our evidence) 
we are justified in treating p as true and using it as a premise in practical reasoning. The third 
is an attitude taken not toward propositions but toward sources of information: trusting the 
assurances of source.  
To demonstrate: imagine there is a screen that displays a number between 0 and 120. 
Some proportion of the time—say 74%—the number is the readout from a thermometer in 
Death Valley; the rest of the time it is randomly generated. Insofar as you treat the readouts 
on the screen as reliable evidence about the temperature, there is a natural sense in which we 
should say you believe the screen. Perhaps, given that you believe the screen, you will be 
inclined to treat the fact that it says ‘80’ as decisive evidence and adopt the belief that it is 80º 
in Death Valley. Or you could respond with more nuanced credences, reasoning from the fact 
that the screen displays an accurate readout 74% of the time to a credence .74 that it is 80º in 
Death Valley. Either way, the explanation of why you have the credences and beliefs you do 
will trace back, in part, to the fact that the screen ‘told’ you that it’s 80º, and you believe the 
screen.18  
In which sense of ‘belief’ might we owe belief to speakers? One way to get at this is to ask 
what we do wrong when we refuse someone’s testimony. It is not just that we underestimate 
their evidential value as an informant, and so end up less epistemically rational than we might 
have been. The testifier has a different complaint: it is “an insult and an injury to not be 
believed.”19 Rejecting someone’s testimony treats them as an unreliable source, ineligible to 
give adequate assurances—and so as either incompetent or insincere. Treating someone this 
way is insulting if you lack specific reason to think that the speaker is in fact unreliable. 
Plausibly, speakers are entitled to reasonable trust; roughly, to being believed unless there is 
 
17 I remain neutral here on the debate over whether the conception of full belief as a subjective attitude of 
full confidence can be reduced to high credence. 
18 Incidentally, both of these attitudes are open to you regardless of whether your justification for treating 
the screen’s readouts this way is that you have a wealth of evidence for the screen’s reliability (reductionist) or 
simply that you are entitled to treat it as default-reliable absent defeaters (non-reductionist). 
19 G.E.M. Anscombe, “What Is It to Believe Someone?,” in Rationality and Religious Belief, ed. C.F. Delaney 
(Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 1979), 141-51, 150. The same point has been emphasized by several 
authors working on testimonial injustice, including Hazlett, “Special Insult of Refusing Testimony” and Geoff 
Pynn, “Testimonial Injustice and Epistemic Degradation,” in Applied Epistemology, ed. Jennifer Lackey (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
 
 
specific reason to doubt them. In §5, I’ll examine what interests could ground this kind of 
entitlement. For now, though, it will be enough to fill in the content of the entitlement. 
First, notice that it doesn’t seem especially plausible that someone (to whom we do not 
stand any special relationship) has a right to be believed in either of the first to senses: to our 
developing full confidence in or closing inquiry on a proposition simply because they asserted 
p. Insofar as speakers are entitled to be believed, then, the better candidate understanding is 
the third sense: belief as trust in the assurances of a source.20 So in what follows I will (as 
much as possible) speak of trusting speakers, and believing propositions. That is, I embrace 
Anscombe’s conclusion that “believing someone (in the particular case) is trusting him for 
the truth—in the particular case.”21 Putting this all together, what we have so far is an answer 
to (b): speakers have an entitlement to be believed—that is, to have their assurances trusted as 
evidence—when we lack specific reasons to doubt them as reliable testifiers.22  
From what we’ve said so far, this is not such a heavyweight obligation; indeed, one might 
think it eminently reasonable. If this is all #BelieveWomen asks, it is making a very modest 
demand. It is not that we owe special credulity to women qua women, as a group of testifiers. 
Rather, since being a woman is not itself reason to doubt a person’s credibility, our general 
obligation to speakers entails that women, too, are entitled to reasonable trust. So far so good, 
but what are we to do when a speaker whom we trust in this way testifies that p is true? One 
might think (though I do not) that if you believe (trust) a speaker, you must believe what they 
tell you: adopt an attitude of full belief in p. We have arrived, then, at question (c). 
3. Does believing a speaker entail full belief in what they say? 
A. Three ways to believe someone 
The conflict between #BelieveWomen and the presumption of innocence is a tension 
between two ethical demands on our epistemic activities. #BelieveWomen invokes speakers’ 
entitlements to be believed when they testify. The presumption of innocence—or at least an 
appeal to it in everyday contexts—emphasizes people’s claim to our not believing badly of 
them on inadequate evidence.23 These seem to come into conflict most directly in ‘she said/he 
 
20 The suggestion that we frame believing someone as involving trust, rather than believing some 
proposition, is also made by Berislav Marušić and Stephen White, “How Can Beliefs Wrong?—A Strawsonian 
Epistemology,” Philosophical Topics 46 (Spring 2018): 97-114.    
21 Anscombe, “What is to Believe Someone?,” 151. Anscombe herself assumes that if we trust someone in 
this way, then when she asserts flat-out that p, we must adopt an attitude of full-belief in p; here, we part ways. 
22 This view of what it is to believe a speaker is prima facie at odds with Moran’s, on which the act of 
testimony is a giving of assurance, and the fact that the speaker offers such assurance provides (non-evidential) 
reason for the hearer’s belief. But this appearance is misleading: Moran is at pains to distinguish the type of 
justification received from testimony qua intentional assertion from evidence one might receive simply from the 
fact that the person is talking. In taking the speaker’s telling you that p to give you epistemic reason to increase 
your credence in p, you are responding to the testifier as a responsible agent; it is their assurance that you are 
treating as evidence, rather than the brute fact of their having produced some set of noises. 
 23 For recent discussions of such a claim, see, e.g., Rima Basu and Mark Schroeder, “Doxastic Wrongings,” 
in Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology, eds. Brian Kim and Matthew McGrath (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2018), 181-205; Endre Begby, “Doxastic Morality: A Moderately Skeptical Perspective,” Philosophical Topics 46 
 
 
said’ cases, when our only or primary evidence of the wrongdoing is the victim’s testimony.24 
Critics of #BelieveWomen worry that the demand displaces necessary inquiry with something 
like solidarity or blind faith in the victim’s accusation. Ferzan summarizes the concern (which 
she does not endorse) thus:  
If #BelieveWomen tells us that women have as much claim to be believed as men, that 
their testimony gives sufficient warrant for belief, then there is no nuance, no 
credences, and no probabilities. It is a question of which side you believe.25 
Clearly mere side-picking is inappropriate in a courtroom; it is not great practice in everyday 
epistemic dealings, either. The argument underlying this worry can be put like this: believing 
a speaker entails adopting an attitude of full belief in the content of their assertions without 
further inquiry. That attitude is inappropriate in ‘she said/he said’ cases, because it conflicts 
with the presumption of innocence; therefore, the demand to #BelieveWomen is 
unreasonable. 
Focus on the first step of this argument. Why should we accept it? It does not follow from 
either reductionism or non-reductionism about testimonial justification. Grant that (directly 
or derivatively) a speaker’s testimony gives you some justification for confidence in p. If you 
do not form a full belief in p, but you do increase your confidence roughly in proportion with 
the justification received, do you wrong the speaker? Nothing we’ve said so far implies this: 
what we owe to speakers is to not reject their testimony without specific reason. Failing to 
respond to testimony that p with flat-out belief that p constitutes rejecting testimony only if 
believing a speaker entails believing the proposition asserted by the speaker. If it doesn’t, there 
need not be a conflict between the demands of #BelieveWomen and the epistemic care we 
should take when the stakes are high (and must take in courts as a matter of procedural 
justice). So, the central question is whether believing a person necessarily involves taking an 
attitude of full belief toward the proposition they assert. 
Something like this is a pretty common background assumption, I’ll grant. But I don’t 
think we should accept it. I won’t so much argue against the assumption as present an 
alternative, and suggest that this alternative has enough going for it that we should interpret 
#BelieveWomen as invoking it instead. The assumed picture is something like 
 
(Spring 2018): 155-72; Georgi Gardiner, “Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment,” in Believing in Accordance 
with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism, ed. Kevin McCain (New York: Springer, 2018), 169-95; Sarah 
Moss, “Moral Encroachment,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (July 2018): 177-205; Mark Schroeder, 
“When Beliefs Wrong,” Philosophical Topics 46 (Spring 2018): 115-27. 
24 I here follow Georgi Gardiner (“The ‘She Said, He Said’ Paradox and the Proof Paradox” in Truth and 
Trials: Dilemmas at the Intersection of Epistemology and Philosophy of Law, eds. Zachery Hoskins and Jon 
Robson (Routledge, forthcoming)), in referring to these cases as ‘she said/he said,’ because the order of the 
testimonies—that her accusation comes first, predictably followed by his denial—is significant to the evidential 
value of each assertion. These cases do not straightforwardly pattern with simple disagreement cases, in which 
two equally well-placed and equally trustworthy speakers with matched or no incentives to lie disagree about a 
fact. 
25 Ferzan ms, p. 22 
 
 
(i) To believe someone who asserts that p is take the attitude of full belief toward 
the propositional content of their assertion.  
Ferzan does not quite endorse (i); she instead embraces a weaker formulation: 
(ii) To believe someone who asserts that p is “to take the claim on board at the 
same level of credence as the speaker offers it.” (Ferzan ms p. 20) 
This departs from (i) only in cases where the testifier hedges their claim, saying ‘I think 
that…’ or ‘probably…’. But if the testifier flat-out asserts p, then (ii) would usually require 
flat-out believing p.   
Notice that both of these are specified in terms of posteriors, the epistemic attitudes you 
have after you have heard the testimony. We certainly sometimes use phrases like ‘believe 
me!’ to express a demand for one of these two attitudes. But I think there is also a natural 
sense of believing someone that is concerned not with posteriors but with priors: your 
dispositions to take the speaker’s assurances to justify raising your confidence in p, which you 
have even before you’ve heard their testimony or worked through your total evidence to reach 
your ultimate verdict on p. This is taking them to be a trustworthy epistemic source; someone 
whose intentional assertions give you evidence not merely that they are talking, but that the 
propositions they assert are likely true. It is the sense in which you believe your zoologist 
friend when she tells you an obscure fact about Australian marsupials, but not the breathless 
five-year-old who relates his adventures fighting an invisible dragon. You believe someone in 
this sense when you are disposed to treat their assertions as giving you strong evidence in 
favor of the truth of what they’ve said. More formally, 
(iii-a) To believe someone who asserts that p is to take the fact that they testify that p 
to give you epistemic reason, greater than a magnitude m, and proportional to your 
estimation of their trustworthiness, to increase your confidence in p. 26  
On this interpretation, #BelieveWomen instructs us to ensure that our estimation of the 
evidential support for p that we receive from hearing a woman testify is at least m, absent 
specific evidence that she is not trustworthy—and be disposed to increase our credence in p 
accordingly. This is precisely the disposition that we counted as believing the screen’s reports 
about the temperature in Death Valley. Importantly, even if your estimation of a witnesses’ 
trustworthiness is quite high, believing them in the (iii-a) sense won’t always result in having 
a high enough posterior confidence in p to count as full belief in p. If you started out with a 
low enough initial degree of confidence, or the rest of your evidence strongly supports ~p, or 
 
26m here is a variable that controls how demanding this standard is; I remain neutral on what specific values 
it should take. Note that this constraint is applied to priors, rather than posterior credence in p: it requires that 
the credence you are disposed to have in p conditional just on the speaker’s testimony that p be sufficiently 
greater than your credence in p without the testimony. Expressed more formally: C(p|‘S testifies that p’) - C(p)   
> m. This constraint is relatively weak; it does not prescribe any particular posterior degree of confidence in p, 
since if your total evidence strongly supports ~p, you can satisfy this condition and still ultimately have a final 
credence in p below 0.5. My thanks to Richard Bradley for discussion on this point.  
 
 
if belief is not just a matter of high credence, you may well believe the person who told you p 
but not believe p. 27 Though certainly this introduces a level of nuance not usually present in 
Twitter exchanges, I think it is still true to the everyday phenomenology of trusting speakers 
and other sources of testimony.  
I expect that some readers will immediately find (iii-a) unsatisfactory; surely believing 
someone involves much more than just increasing my credence in what they’ve said! I agree, 
but resist the suggestion that we should fill in the details of this ‘much more’ by requiring that 
our posterior confidences be substantially higher (or reach full confidence in p), as (i) and (ii) 
do. Rather, there are a number of other ways that trusting someone’s testimony should 
restructure our epistemic orientation: changing what we take to be relevant counter-
possibilities, framing what questions we take to be important, what evidence we look for (and 
how hard), which working assumptions we adopt, and, of course, which propositions we start 
treating as default-accepted unless we have specific reason to doubt them.28 
Perhaps especially relevant: if you believe the person who testifies but fall short of forming 
a full-belief in the content of their testimony, you’ll still be keeping an eye out for some error 
possibilities—maybe there’s additional evidence that contextualizes what they’ve said—but 
you won’t be focused on whether they’re lying. You won’t be discounting what they’ve said in 
proportion to some statistic about how often people ‘like them’ have been wrong in the past. 
If you believe the person, you apply scrutiny in the first instance to your overall evidence on 
p, not to the credibility of the witness. To reflect all this, we should supplement the evidence-
oriented condition (iii-a) with an additional inquiry-oriented condition, something like (iii-b): 
(iii-b)  […] and to focus your subsequent inquiry on p (rather than on the 
trustworthiness of the testifier). 
This doesn’t mean we disallow evaluations of the speaker’s credibility, but they are not the 
central focus of our inquiry if we believe the speaker.29 It does require treating p as a live 
 
27 This holds for both of the two concepts of belief as a propositional attitude I mentioned above. Suppose 
belief is credence above a certain threshold or an attitude of full confidence (equivalent to credence 1). Then if 
you started with a low prior, or had mixed evidence about p, you may end up with a credence too low to count 
in belief even if you have a lot of confidence in the credibility of your source. Suppose instead that, in line with 
Jacob Ross and Mark Schroeder (“Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 88 (March 2014): 259–288), whether I believe p is a question about what my 
reasoning defaults are: if I routinely consider the risks given the remaining probability of ~p, then I don't have a 
full belief that p—even if my credence in p is extremely high. Conversely, if I routinely assume that p (either 
consciously or by not even questioning whether p, as one might if 'p' is 'the coffee is safe to drink'), then I believe 
p, even if my actual credence in p is pretty low (.58, say). Probably believing when at this credence is irrational, 
but I'd still say someone who reasons this way believes p). Believing in this sense is closing inquiry—and you can 
have reached quite a high credence in p, based on your source’s testimony, without closing inquiry about p.  
28 I owe this insight to Georgi Gardiner, who develops some of these themes in “The Reasonable and the 
Relevant: Legal Standards of Proof,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 47 (Summer 2019): 288-318; and “Doubt and 
Disagreement in the #MeToo Era,” in Feminist Philosophers on #MeToo, ed. Yolonda Wilson (Abingdon: 
Routledge, forthcoming). 
29 Believing a speaker does not mean we cease looking for defeaters, either. But it does change what sort of 
defeater we seek: we should remain vigilant for rebutting defeaters (facts which indicate that p is false), but not 
 
 
question, rather than as likely false: it directs us to seek the evidence we would expect to find 
if p is true, rather than spending energy inventing hypotheses to explain how a lying witness 
would produce the specific testimony received. It also affects how we rank the plausibility of 
the various hypotheses: believing a witness’ statement that p gives us reason to take seriously 
possibilities that render p consistent with our other evidence, even if they’re complicated, and 
to demote hypotheses that would imply that our witness is lying, even if they are simpler.30  
One last note on the picture I am offering here: if believing a speaker is just to treat their 
testimony as evidence relevant to your inquiry in the ways detailed by (iii[a-b]), we clearly 
need not presuppose the truth of non-reductionism in order to affirm that speakers are 
entitled to this form of belief when they testify. Any plausible version of reductionism about 
testimonial justification will still maintain that it is rational for us to take testimony to give us 
epistemic reason (proportional to our estimation of their trustworthiness) to raise our 
credences in p. This is unsurprising, given the independence of the evidential and ethical 
questions.  
B. She said/he said revisited: believing conflicting testimony 
If we accept that believing (trusting) a speaker need not involve forming the full belief that 
p, then we can avoid the worries that many (including Ferzan and Atwood) raise about the 
call to #BelieveWomen. There need not be any conflict between satisfying this demand, on 
the one hand, and doing due epistemic diligence and respecting due process, on the other.  
Consider the problem of conflicting testimony. Ferzan is absolutely right that if believing 
a person requires forming full belief in the proposition they assert, then when speakers assert 
contradictory contents, we cannot coherently believe them both. Suppose two people (let’s 
call them Alex and Beth) testify to inconsistent contents. It is not possible to form the attitude 
of full belief in p in response to Alex, and simultaneously form the attitude of full belief in ~p, 
in response to Beth, without being incoherent. We can only withhold judgment, or pick a 
side. So, if (i) or (ii) are correct as a model of what it is to believe a speaker, then, when 
presented with conflicting testimony, you face “a question of which side you believe.” (Ferzan 
ms, pg. 22) 
 But even when testimonials conflict, it is perfectly possible to take both testifiers to be 
trustworthy, and so to update your credence in p on both ‘Alex asserts that p’ and ‘Beth asserts 
that ~p.’ If you trust both equally, you may end up with the same credence in p as you had 
when you began, but if believing someone only requires something like (iii), then you will 
have believed both of your sources. You will not have rejected the testimony of either, though 
you will likely need to do more investigating to know whether to believe p.  
 
seek undercutting defeaters (facts that debunk our trust in the speaker). Thanks to Andrew Chignell for 
discussion on this point. 
30 Legal theorist Sherry Colb’s interpretation of the hashtag, as I understand it, takes the hashtag to be saying 
just this, and thus to demand that police in fact believe complainants. Ferzan, by contrast, takes Colb to interpret 
the hashtag as counseling “police to act as if they believe a complainant” (Ferzan ms p.24). See Sherry Colb, 
“What Does #BelieveWomen Mean?” Verdict: Legal Analysis and Commentary from Justicia, 7 November 2018,  
https://verdict.justia.com/2018/11/07/what-does-believewomen-mean. 
 
 
Importantly though, this is if your estimation of trustworthiness is roughly equal for both 
testifiers. In ‘she said/he said’ cases, as Gardiner points out, we are often not justified in 
taking the trustworthiness of a denial to be on par with the trustworthiness of the accusation. 
In general, a speaker’s having a strong incentive to assert something—independent of its 
truth—is a reason to trust their assertion a little less. A person who stands accused of assault 
always has an incentive to deny it; the same does not hold for making an accusation. 31 
Plausibly the base rates matter here, too. A recent meta-analysis of reporting rates found that 
only about 5% of rape reports filed are ‘false’—that is, the evidence yielded by investigation 
either on balance suggested the assault did not occur, or was insufficient to establish that one 
did.32 Taking these numbers at face-value, we would be justified in taking an accusation (at 
least one issuing in a police report) to be reliable 95% of the time—which is a fair bit higher, 
surely, than we should expect from denials. 
C. High costs of belief 
On the face of it, both (i) and (ii) are quite demanding interpretations of what it is to 
believe a speaker. Ferzan takes even (ii) to be ill-suited to the inquiry necessary in legal 
contexts, though perhaps more amenable to everyday dealings. Still, one might worry that it is 
sometimes too demanding even there. Believing that a loved one has committed sexual 
assault sends shockwaves through your life, in a way that believing that it rained while you 
were in the library does not. Intuitively, we are at least permitted to be epistemically cautious, 
requiring more (or more compelling) evidence before we close inquiry on high-stakes 
propositions like these. We may be tempted to think that an advocate of (ii) could appeal to 
pragmatic encroachment here, but it cannot do the work; it is addressed to the wrong 
question.  
Pragmatic encroachment is a theory that explains why a degree of evidential justification 
that usually suffices to permit rational belief is insufficient when the stakes of mistakenly 
having that belief are high.33 So if we’re addressing the evidential question, asking whether 
testimony gives agents facing high costs sufficient evidence to make belief that p rational, 
 
31 Gardiner, “Doubt and Disagreement.” 
32 Claire Ferguson and John Malouff, “Assessing Police Classifications of Sexual Assault Reports: A Meta-
Analysis of False Reporting Rates,” Archives of Sexual Behavior 45 (July 2016): 1185-93, doi:10.1007/s10508-015-
0666-2. Because the police records used for the studies analyzed do not distinguish between investigations 
concluding with evidence that the assault did not occur, and those concluding with insufficient evidence that 
one did, these numbers almost certainly over-counts false reports, but it is hard to estimate by how much. 
33 Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath, “Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification,” Philosophical Review 111 
(January 2002): 67-94; John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley, “Knowledge and Action,” Journal of Philosophy 105 
(October 2008): 571–90; Ross and Schroeder, “Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment:’ 259–288; Brian 
Weatherson, “Can we do Without Pragmatic Encroachment?,” Philosophical Perspectives 19 (December 2005): 
417–43. For an overview of how different theorists formulate pragmatic encroachment, and how moral stakes 
might be relevant to the evidence required to justify a belief, see Renée Jorgensen Bolinger, “Varieties of Moral 
Encroachment,” Philosophical Perspectives  (forthcoming). For a discussion of how the moral costs of failing to 
form justified beliefs about rape could make skepticism inappropriate, see Bianca Crewe and Jonathan Jenkins 
Ichikawa, “Rape Culture and Epistemology,” in Applied Epistemology, ed. Jennifer Lackey (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, forthcoming). 
 
 
pragmatic encroachment can be leveraged to say ‘no.’ But if that’s not the relevant question—
if we’re instead asking whether respecting the speaker’s entitlement to be believed (trusted) 
still requires the agent to believe p, even when that belief would be costly—then pragmatic 
encroachment only has space to operate if we interpret believing speakers my way. If we 
embrace either (i) or (ii), then believing someone requires at least matching your credence to 
the strength of their assertion; if the speaker flat-out asserts p, then both (i) and (ii) require 
you to flat-out believe p in response, or else you fail to believe the speaker. There is no room 
here to ask whether your total evidence, including their testimony, is adequately justifying 
given the stakes you face. 
Of course, failing to believe only wrongs the testifier if we owed them belief. Maybe there’s 
room for an advocate of (i) or (ii) to argue that speakers are only entitled to be trusted when 
their testimony in fact gives adequate justification for full belief given the stakes facing the 
hearer. But this suggestion makes the foundations of the speaker’s entitlement pretty 
mysterious. The stakes of belief for the hearer are often not transparent, and not obviously of 
concern, to the testifier. So if what the speaker has a claim to is being trusted just when the 
hearer’s evidence rationally permits full belief in their context—to your believing that p on 
their say-so if and only if your evidence suffices to justify belief, given your actual and 
unknown circumstances—the grounds for this moral claim must be quite abstract.  
It’s hard to think which interests of the speaker could ground such a claim, or how they 
could complain that they are wronged by failure. It cannot be that they are wronged 
whenever we fail to form beliefs which we are justified in having. We do that all the time, 
when we fail to draw inferences on the information we already have, or fail to notice or 
process evidence in our visual field, etc. The complaint a speaker has against our failing to 
believe them qua testifier is not principally that we have failed to form a justified cognitive 
attitude.  
Pragmatic encroachment is well-suited to explain when an agent should close inquiry on 
p, given their evidence and the comparative costs of relevant errors risked. But the theory is 
not equipped to tell us how to balance the harms to others of rejecting testimony against our 
own high stakes to determine when others have a claim to our believing. By contrast, the 
notion of reasonable trust is capacious, well-suited to exactly this kind of balancing. As Karen 
Jones develops the notion, reasonable trust 
…can encompass different kinds of reasons that count in favor of trust, from 
epistemic, to instrumental, to reasons that follow from commitment to an ideal. In 
some cases, you will need evidence sufficient for a strongly justified belief that the 
other is trustworthy. In other cases, trust can be reasonable in response to someone’s 
explicit invitation to trust (depending on domain and consequences of misplaced 
trust)…34 
 
34 Jones, Counting on One Another: A Theory of Trust and Trustworthiness (unpublished manuscript) 
Chapter 4, ms pg. 17. 
 
 
Reasonable trust in a trustworthy but fallible speaker won’t straightforwardly generate an 
obligation to match your credence in p to the strength with which they asserted it, much less 
to flat-out believe it. You might well have other evidence that you shouldn’t disregard, or be 
facing significant practical stakes. If I have reasonable trust in Annie, then when her assertion 
that p gives me adequate evidence in context for full belief (together with my other evidence), 
I will adopt an attitude of full belief toward p. But otherwise I will simply become more 
confident in p.  
 All the action happens in the ethical question, not the evidential question. We are not 
concerned that in failing to believe someone’s testimony we will be irrational; we are 
concerned that we will wrong them. Our epistemic lives are shot through with ethical 
considerations, and while recent debates over ‘moral encroachment’ on the epistemic have 
focused on whether we can wrong someone through what we believe about them,35 the 
important point here is that whether we believe (trust) them is also ethically charged. This 
need not mean that trusting speakers as we ought is in competition with more narrowly 
epistemic aims; we need not sacrifice truth in particular cases in order to advance the ethical 
project. Indeed, bringing our actual epistemic practice into alignment with the normative 
demands of reasonable trust may make us more rational by a number of metrics, by 
correcting ways our inquiry is presently distorted by bias.   
 Acknowledging these ethical dimensions is important, not just because it 
appropriately foregrounds that we owe it to stakeholders to improve our epistemic practices, 
but because the distortions we aim to address can be incredibly difficult to spot or fix when 
approached as purely epistemic problems.36 Distrust does not always manifest as an 
unreasoned refusal to believe anything someone says. We can distrust someone by failing to 
attach adequate weight to their testimony, or by holding them to inappropriately strict 
standards (requiring perfect recall of all details from an event years in the past, or being able 
to rule out quite unlikely alternative explanations of events, etc.) before we will accept what 
they say. Distrust can also manifest in seeking defeaters too readily, or focusing 
disproportionately on the possibility that they are lying or unreliable.  
4. Innocent presumptions and the presumption of innocence 
If you’re persuaded by what I’ve said so far—that #BelieveWomen urges us to place the 
same default trust in women that we place in other testifiers, and that this requires us to take 
the fact that a woman testifies to p to provide evidence in favor of p’s truth—then it is 
puzzling how appeals to due process, or reminders about the presumption of innocence, 
conflict with appropriate trust in women’s testimony. Is this all just a confusion? Given the 
demands of #BelieveWomen (as I propose to understand them), is there anything 
 
35 See references in note 23. 
36 Gardiner, “Doubt and Disagreement” surveys a range of reasons why the symptoms of unjustified distrust 
of women can, in these cases, deceptively feel like cognitive achievement, and so be uniquely difficult to identify 
as rational distortions.  
 
 
inappropriate about reminding interlocutors of the importance of the Presumption of 
Innocence? 
 While the obligation to believe women as I have interpreted it is fully consistent with 
respecting due process and the presumption of innocence, there is still a conflict implied by 
such reminders. To draw this out, let’s start by getting more precise about what the 
‘presumption of innocence’ does and doesn’t involve, in American criminal law contexts. As 
Ferzan’s discussion makes plain, the content of the presumption is procedural; respecting it 
involves doing two things:37 
POI-Default: setting ‘innocent’ as the default for what to conclude if the relevant 
standard of proof is not met.     
POI-as-No-Evidence: taking the attitude that one has no evidence concerning whether 
the defendant is guilty prior to the proceedings. 
POI-Default is necessary in trials because the court cannot simply withhold in the way that an 
individual can, or even conclude with a hedged “probably the accused is guilty.” Because of 
the structure of a trial, the finder of fact must in the end rule either p or ~p; the standard of 
proof sets a threshold for the degree of evidential support that will suffice to justify ruling that 
p, and the presumption of innocence identifies ~p as the default if that threshold is not 
cleared. 
The presumption of innocence as no-evidence requires that our priors—our degree of 
confidence in p before we hear any evidence—should be either concentrated at .5 (reflecting 
the fact that we think p is as likely to be true as false), or spread evenly across the full space of 
possibilities 0-1.38 So, prior to hearing the testimony, the presumption of innocence requires 
that we not take the bare fact of an accusation as evidence of guilt. 
When invoked in informal contexts, the presumption is sometimes glossed as requiring 
something much stronger than this: 
Material-POI: to outright believe that the accused is innocent (~p), until presented 
with overwhelming evidence to the contrary. 
Material-presumption of innocence requires that we start with full confidence in ~p. There are 
reasons to worry about whether assuming that the accused is in fact innocent is coherent in all 
 
37 These correspond roughly to the main functions of the presumption of innocence in American criminal 
law, as characterized by Ferzan. The POI-as-No-Evidence is the ‘probatory presumption of innocence,’ which 
Ferzan glosses as meaning “that the jury (or other state actor) starts with the presumption that it simply has no 
evidence of the defendant’s guilt.” The POI-Default highlights the role of the presumption in allocating the 
burden of proof; it is “the corollary of proof beyond a reasonable doubt” (Ferzan ms, p. 30). 
38 The no-evidence starting point is not necessarily equivalent to taking it to be precisely equally likely that 
the accused is innocent as that he is guilty. Some argue that jurors ought to be permitted to use their knowledge 
of background facts about the frequency of the crime to inform their prior credences; I here opt for the less 
committal suggestion that they spread their credences across the full range. As I’ll demonstrate in a moment, the 
differences do not matter for our present purposes. (See discussion in Richard D. Friedman, “A Presumption of 
Innocence, Not of Even Odds,” Stanford Law Review 52 (May 2000): 873-87.) 
 
 
the contexts in which the presumption of innocence is required.39 But even this way of 
interpreting the presumption of innocence does not genuinely conflict with believing women, 
if we respect the evidence we receive.  
Here’s why: an accusation is made. We start with no evidence, then the accuser offers her 
testimony that p. If we’re good Bayesians, we update by conditionalizing our prior in p on 
how probable p is given this new evidence. Where this leaves us depends on where we started, 
how attached we were to that starting point (sometimes called resilience), and how much we 
trust the evidence we got.  If we put more stock in the trustworthiness of the testimony than 
in our starting presumptions—which we should— then no matter our starting point, it will be 
pretty easy for testimony that p to move us to significant confidence in p. The more attached 
we are to the starting point (or the less we trust the testimony), the more the difference 
between the alternative understandings of the presumption of innocence makes a difference 
to the post-update degree of confidence. If the starting point is resilient, it will take an 
overwhelming amount of evidence to convince someone who starts out presuming ~p that in 
fact p is probably true. But insofar as the presumption of innocence is a stance defined by the 
absence of any evidence, the starting credence it yields should not be resilient, and so should 
easily shift in response to the weight of evidence with any real probative force. 
This fact is actually what helps to make sense of the complaint that invocations of the 
presumption of innocence in everyday contexts—like Twitter exchanges—imply that accusers 
are lying, or shouldn’t be trusted. There are various pragmatic principles, or maxims, typically 
operating in the background of our everyday conversations. To abide by them, you must 
make your contribution not only true, but efficiently informative and on-topic, given our 
shared information and the goals of our conversation.40 Reminding your conversational 
partners about what to do in the absence of evidence is an unhelpful contribution to make 
immediately after receiving evidence. So, if you’re being cooperative, you must mean 
something else by asserting it: not just that presuming innocence is a good starting place, but 
that even now, having heard the testimony, we shouldn’t stray far from that starting point.  
This would only be true if you took the testimony to have little to no evidential value. 
Here it might be useful to return to the screen example. If >50% of the time the screen just 
displays a randomly generated number, then seeing what’s on it gives you little reason to 
believe that’s the temperature in the desert. But it would be inappropriate to retain this 
attitude if you knew that the screen was pretty reliable (especially if it was known to report 
falsely only 5% of the time!). So, if, after seeing ‘80º’ on the screen, you reprimand someone 
for saying that’s probably the temperature in the desert right now, your assertion 
pragmatically implicates that we cannot treat the screen as reliable. 
Given that respecting testimony entails taking it to be some evidence for p, reasserting 
either that we should presume that ~p, or that we lack probative evidence as to whether p, is 
 
39 Ferzan discusses several of them in her paper (pp.29-32); I will not rehearse them here. 
40 These are the Gricean maxims of Quality, Quantity, and Relevance. See H.P. Grice, “Logic and 
Conversation,” in Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech Arts, eds. Peter Cole and Jerry Morgan (New York: Academic 
Press, 1975), 41-58.  
 
 
to disregard the testimony we’ve been offered. When an appeal to the presumption of 
innocence is used as a reply to the claim that victim testimony is probative evidence, the 
underlying picture thereby forwarded embeds skepticism about the testimony. It 
pragmatically implies that the testimony either isn’t evidence at all, or counts for very little.41 
Both of these possibilities are incompatible with taking the testifier to be a reliable source of 
information, and so imply that she is either lying or incompetent. Making these appeals, then, 
is in conflict with the demands of #BelieveWomen, though there is no conflict between 
actually respecting the presumption of innocence and believing women. 
5. The entitlement to be believed, revisited 
The account that I’ve offered is reasonably lightweight, as obligations to believe go. It 
basically only requires being disposed to treat women’s testimony as relevant evidence. 
Hopefully, this sounds reasonable – like what we should be doing anyway just to be rational. 
You might suspect that this is because my account is not really an analysis of what it takes to 
believe someone, or at any rate not what is invoked by #BelieveWomen. So—especially if you 
were skeptical about the hashtag’s demands— you might feel that I’ve changed the subject. 
Does the lightweight thing I’ve outlined really count as believing a speaker? And even if it 
does, is it plausible to think that speakers are actually entitled to that? 
To settle these fears, I’ll try to make good on the promissory note from earlier to revisit 
the interests that ground a speakers’ entitlement to be believed. If what I’ve outlined can serve 
those interests, that’s some evidence that my proposal should count as a viable interpretation 
of what it takes to believe a speaker. 
There are of course some (by now familiar) non-instrumental interests a speaker has in 
being taken to be a credible source of testimony, at least by some hearers, sometimes. These 
are the speaker’s interests in participating as an agent in good standing in the epistemic 
community. In rejecting their testimony, we represent them as unreliable. This is both 
diminishing and excludes them from the participatory goods of a valuable epistemic 
practice.42 Plausibly these participatory interests at least ground a claim against the type of 
epistemic injustice that is the primary focus of Fricker (2007): being specially distrusted, 
relative to others, due to an identity prejudice. But this is not yet a claim to being believed. It 
isn’t clear that interlocutors who uniformly resist trusting anyone’s testimony about sexual 
 
41 This is not to say that every reminder about the presumption of innocence made after we receive 
testimony implies that testimony is evidentially weightless. Conversational implicatures can be explicitly 
cancelled; for instance, if the instruction “I remind the jury that the fact that the defendant has been accused is 
not itself evidence of guilt; you must weigh the evidence…” is continued with “…including the testimony from 
the complainant,” the implication that her testimony is not evidence is cancelled, because the instruction 
provides an explicit alternative explanation for the relevance of making the utterance. 
42 Fricker, Epistemic Injustice emphasizes wrongs of this sort, which have been elaborated by subsequent 
authors writing on testimonial injustice. There is a particularly nice discussion in Pynn, “Testimonial Injustice.” 
 
 
assault or harassment transgresses any speaker’s claim to being counted as a participant in the 
epistemic community more generally.43  
The simpler explanation for how exactly we wrong a speaker when we inappropriately 
reject their testimony appeals to more instrumental considerations. Let’s focus in particular 
on the social and political role of testimony, and work backward to characterize the testifier’s 
moral interest in being believed.44 There are some sorts of facts for which we simply must take 
someone else’s word. The reasons for this forced reliance vary: evaluating the evidence might 
require expertise we do not have, or access to evidence we cannot get, or the ability to observe 
phenomena from a particular vantage, point in time, location, or social identity. To have 
evidence-sensitive beliefs or credences about these facts at all, we will have to trust someone’s 
testimony; we will have to rely on someone vouching for a fact. 
When a speaker’s concrete interests depend on policy decisions made about facts of this 
kind, and she does have direct epistemic access to those facts, she has a very strong interest in 
being considered eligible to vouch for them. When she is not—when those who influence the 
policy decisions are not disposed to treat her assurances that p as evidence in favor of the 
truth of p—then there are two possibilities: either they trust no one to vouch for those facts, or 
they deny her (and/or her social group)influence that they grant to others. 
If we trust no one to vouch for the facts, we distrust all testimony on the issue, and must 
throw up our hands saying “who can know?” whenever an accusation is made without 
enough independent evidence to warrant belief in the absence of the victim’s testimony. There 
are special contexts—when the testimonials are equally credible, a thorough investigation has 
been done, and the evidence remains equivocal—in which we must accept that the facts are 
murky. But when this is the default position, it is functionally equivalent to declining to 
enforce victims’ rights. Since the accused always have a strong incentive to issue a denial, this 
policy will lead to systematic failure to enforce the rights of victims or protect them from 
future victimization.  
 We are typically at least slightly more trusting: willing to believe the testimonials we 
find plausible, while ignoring the others. The trouble here is that we evaluate whether 
testimony sounds trustworthy by quickly checking it against how common we take the type 
of event reported to be, and how often we think people lie about it. (This is why, for instance, 
no one believes men on Tinder who say they’re 6ft tall.) But if our sense of these relative 
frequencies isn’t itself informed by reliable evidence, we’re likely to be woefully inaccurate, 
and misplace our (mis)trust. Similarly, when deciding how much weight to give to 
testimonial evidence, it is well and good to emphasize the need to balance the risks to the 
accuser of dismissing a true accusation against the risks to the accused of accepting a false 
accusation. But to do this balancing successfully, we need to have some estimation of the 
 
43 This form of domain-specific distrust does not count as a testimonial injustice on Fricker’s original 
model. It might be accommodated by the notion of content-based testimonial injustice outlined by Davis, “A 
Tale of Two Injustices.” However, since the grounds for rejecting testimony in this domain is skepticism, rather 
than an associated identity prejudice, it may not fall under any direct model of testimonial injustice. 
44 My thanks to Daniel Viehoff for helpful discussion on this point. 
 
 
comparative likelihoods of each type of error. We cannot hope to succeed if we procedurally 
and systematically underestimate the odds of one type of error (e.g., by discounting the 
testimony of those who are in a position to give evidence).  
Unfortunately, all of these harms are on display in our current approach to accusations of 
sexual assault. We tend to dismiss claims that we take to be improbable, and police are more 
likely to decline investigation if they think false reports are common. But this is something of 
a vicious cycle. There is a significant discrepancy between the actual comparative prevalence 
of assaults vs. unsubstantiated accusations, on the one hand, and beliefs about these rates held 
by members of the general public and police departments, on the other. In the US, victims 
only file police reports in 32-59% of sexual assaults.45 The reported frequency of assault is 
thus substantially lower than the real frequency of victimisation. Routine non-investigation 
magnifies the disincentive for victims to report or testify, further widening the gap between 
the actual rates of assault and the evidence preserved in police records. The all-too-
predictable consequence is that the people tasked with investigating whether a reported assault 
occurred approach victim testimony already skeptical about its evidential value, believing 
assaults to be much less, and false accusations much more, common than they actually are. As 
Turkheimer (2019) summarizes,  
In one survey of nearly nine hundred police officers, more than half of the 
respondents stated that ten to fifty percent of sexual assault complainants lie about 
being assaulted, while another ten percent of respondents asserted that the number of 
false reports is fifty-one to a hundred percent. Another study found that more than 
half of the detectives interviewed believed that forty to eighty percent of sexual assault 
complaints are false.46  
As a reminder: the actual rates of false reporting are closer to 5%.  
 To summarize: we have an interest in our testimony being received as evidence, because 
we need to be able to offer evidence to motivate action to protect our rights. Thus, even 
though the duty I have outlined is not very demanding, this lightweight duty serves a pretty 
heavyweight moral interest for the testifier. If we assume that when an agent has a compelling 
moral interest which can be secured at reasonably low cost, she plausibly has a claim right, it 
is plausible that speakers do have a right to being believed in the sense that I have outlined. 
 
45 U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Female Victims of Sexual Violence, 1994-2010, 
by Michael Planty and Lynn Langton (2013; revised 2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fvsv9410.pdf. 
The belief that the police will not do anything, or that the personal costs of reporting are too high, are among the 
most common justifications given for not filing a report. 
46 Deborah Tuerkheimer, “Incredible Women: Sexual Violence and the Credibility Discount,” University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 166 (December 2017): 1-58, 16; Tuerkheimer cites Amy Dellinger Page, “Gateway to 
Reform? Policy Implications of Police Officers’ Attitudes Toward Rape,” American Journal of Criminal Justice 33 
(May 2008): 44, 55; U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, National Institute of Justice Visiting 
Fellowship: Police Investigation of Rape— Roadblocks and Solutions (December 2010), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/232667.pdf.  
 
 
 To be clear, I do not think that this minimal entitlement is the only form of belief we 
can owe to someone. I think we do owe this to strangers, and yes, to all women. (Remember, 
we owe a qualified duty, to treat their testimony as reason-giving when we lack specific reason 
to doubt their reliability.) But we can acquire thicker obligations in the context of closer 
relationships. We might indeed have duties to believe the best of our friends, or accept the 
testimony of our partners even when it is unlikely to be true, given the rest of our evidence. I 
do not think anything I have said commits us to the existence of these duties, but I do not 
want to rule them out, nor would I deny that we could remind someone of these obligations 
by saying they ought to “believe me.”47 My aim in this paper has only been to articulate the 
nature of the entitlement that speakers may have to be believed by people they have never 
met. 
6. The heart of the problem: a social, affective deficit 
I’d like in closing briefly to float a rather different interpretation of the function of 
#BelieveWomen. It’s natural to think about testimony as an interaction between individuals: 
one speaker, one hearer, abstracted from a larger community. But as I emphasized in the 
previous section, there’s also a social dimension to testimony. This extends to credibility 
assessments; we do not just rely on each other to vouch for facts. We also vouch for people as 
sources of information. Rather than calculate the trustworthiness of every speaker ourselves, 
we outsource—or distribute—this labor to others in the community. We do this by relying on 
social signals about trustworthiness.48  
If we interpret #BelieveWomen not as an imperative demanding full belief, but as an 
epistemic instruction aimed to correct the underlying credibility deficit women face when 
individuals assess their evidence, we might think of it as saying, roughly, ‘Women have a 
quite low misleading-testimony base rate for first-personal reports of sexual harassment or 
assault, so assign high credence when they testify.’ Formalized, this would presumably be 
something like: ‘Where p is a first-personal victim’s report of sexual assault, the relative 
frequency in past cases of [~p & a woman testifies that p] is quite rare. So, your credence in 
~p, conditional on [a woman testifies that p] should be very low. So all else equal, on getting 
evidence a woman testifies that p, the rational agent should update to a high credence in p.’ 
Simplified into advice that your father might follow in his everyday activities, this would be: 
‘trust women (far) more than you do on this topic.’  
As a direction to individual believers, it is unlikely that a corrective of this kind will go 
very far in addressing the harms that motivated the #BelieveWomen campaign. The extent of 
our distrust — the readiness with which hearers seek defeaters for women’s testimony to 
 
47 My thanks particularly to Johann Frick and Elizabeth Harman for discussion on this point. For further 
development on the suggestion that we might have relationship-based obligations to believe well of someone, see 
Sarah Stroud, “Epistemic Partiality in Friendship,” Ethics 116 (April 2006): 498-524; Simon Keller, “Friendship 
and Belief,” Philosophical Papers 33 (2004): 329-351.  
48 This theme is developed at length in Karen Jones, Counting on One Another: A Theory of Trust and 
Trustworthiness (manuscript). 
 
 
assault, and the resilience with which they cling to the presumption of innocence even after 
hearing testimony—suggests that the issue is not simply a collection of individual mistakes 
about the weight of their evidence. What #BelieveWomen is up against isn’t, I suggest, an 
individual cognitive problem, but an affective, social one, in which something emotive—the 
fear of false accusation—looms large, and crowds out the trust that underlies confidence in 
testimony.49 
Relatively early in her paper, Ferzan considers in passing that “the demand is an attempt 
to create a positive generic” (ms 4), rather than an epistemic instruction. I think there is 
something to this, but it isn’t straightforward. A ‘generic’ is a bare plural sentence, like  
Ducks lay eggs. 
Mosquitos carry West Nile virus. 
Boys don’t cry. 
Pit bulls are aggressive. 
We readily accept such sentences as true, assert them in everyday contexts, and rely on them 
in reasoning and argumentation. But it’s far from clear what, precisely, we should take the 
semantic content of such sentences to be. They seem to predicate properties in a way that 
quantify over whole groups, but the strength of the quantification is implicit—there is no ‘all,’ 
‘most,’ or ‘some’—and it is not apparently reducible to these common quantifiers. Does 
‘ducks lay eggs’ claim that most ducks lay eggs (or just most female ducks)? That ducks 
generally lay eggs? That it is striking that they do so, or that it is a characteristic property of 
the kind that they engage in egg-laying? The truth conditions of generics are murky; that’s 
part of why they’re so interesting to political philosophers of language and linguists.50  
Generics are pretty close to cognitively basic;51 we use them to sort the world into 
manageable categories. But they’re also incredibly slippery: because generics aren’t explicitly 
quantified, when evaluating one we tend to read it as (say) ‘[some] pit bulls are aggressive’, 
and so accept it as true on the basis of just a couple salient or striking cases. But when 
deploying a generic in reasoning, we have a strong tendency to treat it as (say) ‘[most/all] pit 
bulls are aggressive’.52 This tendency is particularly pronounced when the generics in question 
concern a dangerous property. What Leslie (2017) terms ‘striking property generics’ can 
establish fear and distrust of an entire category, based on a few striking instances. On learning 
of just a handful of cases of Great White sharks attacking surfers off the Australian coast, we 
move quickly to accept the generic ‘sharks attack bathers,’ and subsequently allow it to frame 
our approach to all sorts of sharks as dangerous. There’s an evolutionary advantage to 
 
49 Karen Jones, “Trust, Distrust, and Affective Looping,” Philosophical Studies 176 (April 2019): 955–968. 
50 See, e.g. Ariel Cohen, “Generics, Frequency Adverbs, and Probability,” Linguistics and Philosophy 22 
(June 1999): 221- 253; David Liebesman, “Simple Generics”, Nous, 45(3):409-442, (2011); Sarah-Jane Leslie, 
“The Original Sin of Cognition: Fear, Prejudice, and Generalization,” The Journal of Philosophy 114 (August 
2017): 393-421.  
51 See Leslie, “Original Sin.” 
52 Jennifer Saul, “Are Generics Especially Pernicious?,” Inquiry (2017): 1-18. 
 
 
learning quickly, especially about danger—but it over-generates. The overwhelming majority 
of sharks will never attack, but this fact does little to unseat the striking property generic that 
disposes us to view all members of the kind with suspicion. 
  There is a deep resonance between these generics and the social project of 
#BelieveWomen. Still, generics are still truth-evaluable declaratives, whereas 
‘#BelieveWomen’ is an imperative. It makes a demand, not an assertion; to read it as a generic 
we would have to take it as elliptical for something like ‘women are trustworthy.’ That aside, 
one wonders whether a project to establish a positive generic of the sort imagined could be 
expected to succeed in improving the uptake of women’s testimony. There’s a risk, when 
trying to introduce a positive generic, that you’ll actually only make the negative stereotype 
that you’re trying to displace more salient, and so entrench it instead. Imagine trying to 
establish ‘men aren’t violent’ or ‘pit bulls are safe’ as generics. If the background context is not 
already favorable—and especially if it is already unfavorable, if it already encodes a pernicious 
generic—then these are apt to cement the opposite belief instead. 
This is why rebranding efforts often circumvent the realm of the rational or truth-
evaluable entirely. If there is already widespread acceptance of the pernicious generic ‘pit 
bulls are dangerous’, you don’t fix that by telling people ‘pit bulls are safe’. You try to change 
the frame people use to think about pit bulls, with a little branding.53 You make them seem 
cute and cuddly by calling them ‘pibbles.’ Importantly, this gets in at the level below beliefs: it 
targets the affective frames with which we approach the world, which we use to sort our 
inputs, to resolve ambiguity, to decide what we are seeing, hearing, etc., and how to feel about 
it.54 I want to suggest that #BelieveWomen is precisely this kind of campaign, in which case 
it’s not (primarily) an epistemic directive for individuals. It seeks to restructure cognitive 
architecture at a deeper level, to destabilize an affective frame that represents women as prone 
to making false or specious allegations of sexual assault. The hashtag surfaced in response to a 
particular pattern: the pattern of responding to women’s first-person testimony by implying 
that we have no evidence, raising vague concerns about false allegations, and pointing to a 
(very) small number of striking instances of specious accusations.  
If Jones (2019) is right that attitudes like fear and suspicion undermine trust—and I think 
she is—then to actually address the widespread distrust of women’s testimony we need a 
project in social marketing, aimed to undercut an already existing and widespread striking 
property generic: that women make false or spurious accusations of sexual assault. The target 
is affective; it does not instruct hearers to believe what is asserted by all, most, or even any 
women in particular. It does not even instruct them to try to increase their estimates of 
women’s credibility. Rather, it urges us to interrogate (and abandon) the undeserved affective 
skeptical frame with which we greet women’s testimony in general and about sexual assault 
 
53 Discussed in, among other places, the New York Times: Marisa Meltzer, “The Pit Bull Gets a Rebrand: 
who needs a goldendoodle when you’ve got a ‘pibble’?,” New York Times, Jan. 4, 2019. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/04/style/pit-bull-pibble.html 
54 For more on affective frames, and how they are more explanatory of action and attitude than are 
underlying propositional attitudes like belief (even belief in a generic), see Liz Camp and Carolina Flores “‘That's 
All You Really Are’: Social Trouble With Cognitive Essentialism,” (unpublished ms, on file with the author). 
 
 
especially. That will require attending carefully to the patterns that manifest in our 
conversations about sexual assault, how we talk about women’s testimony, and what 
questions we are disposed to ask when the topic comes up.55  
7. Wrapping up 
So, to summarize: I’ve argued that on a plausible understanding of what being believed as 
a speaker amounts to—namely, being trusted—there is no conflict between appropriately 
believing women who testify and preserving the presumption of innocence and due process. 
Hence, I have suggested that we do in fact have an ethical obligation to believe women, as well 
as an ethical obligation to avoid believing badly of someone on inadequate evidence. Both 
obligations are grounded in our duty to avoid imposing the harms and risks that would result 
from rejecting testimony or making errors arising from our mistaken beliefs. So, while I agree 
that we shouldn’t blindly defer to or ‘side with’ women, there is a plausible reading of 
#BelieveWomen as an imperative, on which the hashtag urges us to have reasonable trust in 
women’s testimony. This requires accepting their testimony as evidence in favor of the 
propositions they assert, and changing our orientation toward error possibilities—in 
particular, it requires that we avoid centering our inquiry on whether the testifier is 
misleading, focusing instead on what the available evidence supports about the events she 
recounts.  
Though I have spent most of this paper working to demonstrate that we can believe 
speakers without adopting an attitude of full confidence in the content of their assertions, I 
do not think that #BelieveWomen actually is best understood as calling for a reform of our 
individual epistemic responses to women’s testimony. Rather, the correction must be a 
project in social epistemology. We don’t just use testimony to vouch for facts; we outsource 
the work of deciding whom to trust, and how much. We vouch for people as trustworthy 
testifiers within domains of expertise: trust him for fashion advice, her for career advice, etc. 
In large social networks, we vouch for types of people (don’t trust politicians or used car 
salesmen; do trust scientists, etc.). When this works well, it is a cognitively efficient way of 
 
55 The interpretation I have offered of the #BelieveWomen campaign is supported by recurring editorials 
that stress the importance of taking women’s testimony seriously, and emphasize that false accusations are much 
rarer—and much more obvious—than they are believed to be. For instance, in 2017 Sady Doyle emphasized: 
“The phrase is “believe women”—meaning, don’t assume women as a gender are especially deceptive or 
vindictive, and recognize that false allegations are less common than real ones” (Doyle, “Despite What you May 
Have Heard, “Believe Women” has Never Meant ‘Ignore Facts’,” Elle, Nov. 29, 2017. 
https://www.elle.com/culture/career-politics/a13977980/me-too-movement-false-accusations-believe-women/). 
More recently, Monica Hess critiqued the substitution of ‘#BelieveAllWomen for the original tag, noting that 
“‘Believe women’ was a reminder, not an absolute rule; the beginning of a process, not an end. It was flexible 
enough to apply to various contexts: Believe women . . . enough to seriously investigate their claims. Believe 
women . . . when they tell you about pervasive indignities — catcalling, leering — that happen to them and their 
friends when you’re not around” (Hess, “Believe Women as a Slogan; Believe All Women is a Strawman,” 
Washington Post, May 11, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/believe-women-was-a-slogan-
believe-all-women-is-a-strawman/2020/05/11/6a3ff590-9314-11ea-9f5e-56d8239bf9ad_story.html). Susan Finaldi 
made the comparison even more explicitly: “the preferred hashtag of the #MeToo movement is #BelieveWomen. 
It’s different without the “all.” Believing women is simply the rejoinder to the ancient practice of 
#DoubtWomen” (Finaldi, “#BelieveAllWomen is a Right Wing Trap”). 
 
 
dividing epistemic labor. But it can go—and has gone—badly. A group of agents have been 
branded as characteristically unreliable in their testimony about an area of policy concern 
that is testimony-dependent. It’s not that people believe that all women lie, no more than that 
all sharks attack bathers. But just a few salient bad cases, blown to mythic proportions and 
deeply embedded in cultural tropes, are sufficient to brand all members of the kind as 
untrustworthy, ineligible to vouch for the facts in that domain. 
When she testified, Blasey-Ford exemplified many of the properties we use to indicate 
trustworthiness: she leads a conservative lifestyle, in general obeys social norms, has advanced 
degrees, has a stable income, spoke in a calm and organized matter, answered questions 
directly, and still the first questions asked (and the majority of subsequent public discussion) 
focused on whether she was trustworthy. What the hashtag calls attention to is that our social 
system of figuring out whom to trust is broken: it unfairly excludes women as sources of 
reliable epistemic testimony, especially on the topics where their testimony is crucial to 
understanding the scope of the problem.  
As I said at the outset, this is a reconstructive (and perhaps partly revisionist) gloss of the 
hashtag; I expect plenty of users do mean things by #BelieveWomen which I have ruled out as 
implausible. But I think there is value in carefully tracing what it could mean, at its best, and 
outlining the nature of the underlying social problem which provoked it. Of course, this is all 
a bit complicated for Twitter, so it’s understandable if people make a hash of it when limited 
to 280 characters (pun intended).  
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